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Abstract—System of Systems (SoS) is a term often used to
describe the coming together of independent systems, collabo-
rating to achieve a new or higher purpose. However, clarity is
needed when using this term given that operational areas may
be unfamiliar with the terminology. In this paper, we present an
approach for refining System and SoS descriptions to aid multi-
stakeholder communication and understanding; building on pre-
vious work, we illustrate an example of characterising a likely
SoS. By identifying key stakeholders, systems, management and
control, this approach supports the initial steps of a SoS security
risk assessment approach using a tool-supported framework that
supports operational needs towards requirements engineering.
Index Terms—System of Systems, MEDEVAC, Security, Risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
To meet evolutionary demands, independent organisations,
networks or systems may need to come together to achieve
a greater or combined purpose. This leads to challenges
and risks arising from the independent yet inter-dependant
interactions of collaborating systems. For example, an emer-
gency response unit may need to interoperate with the police,
fire, ambulance, coastguard, or other critical services. Each
service may be considered an independent system with its own
purpose, people, processes and technology, but collaborates
with the emergency response unit to meet emergency response
mission objectives.
This example of systems coming together for a greater
interaction collaborating with the emergency response unit
could, therefore, be described as being a System of Systems
(SoS). Other examples of systems converging to form a
SoS may be less or more complex, or have differing levels
of management and oversight. SoSs are further challenged
by geographical, organisational, safety, security, and human
factors considerations affecting risk within the SoS as a whole.
Because these considerations are typically greater than that
of a single system, the interactions and interdependencies
increase risks for independent systems, and the SoS as a whole.
Security risks are exacerbated by differing requirements,
goals, trust boundaries, and levels of assurance, some of which
may be unknown. Some risks may, therefore, not exist until
the coming together of the SoS, with further emerging risks
through the evolution of the SoS. Moreover, accounting for
security risk may depend on the structure of the SoS, its
management and control structure, and from what or whose
view within the SoS risk is being assessed. For example,
the emergency response unit provides management, but has
limited control of independent systems. The SoS may be
assessed from the emergency response unit point of view to
form the SoS with independent systems. Alternatively, the
police may assess SoS integration with other systems and
the emergency response unit, independently or as a whole.
In either case, a challenge for SoSs is where each entity may
only know or have access to varying levels of information
about each system in which to assess security risk as a whole.
In other scenarios, a SoS may have limited or no central
management, meaning that security and risk should still be
assessed at a SoS level, but may need to be done at a system
level if there is a weak collaboration with limited or no useful
information to support security risk assessment. Identifying
the SoS context is, therefore, vital to security risk assessment
if we are to appreciate the SoS mission and complexities.
In this paper, we present a method of characterising and
classifying a SoS to support a security risk assessment process
identifying relevant SoS context prior to assessment. We
present the related work upon which our approach is based
in Section II, before presenting the approach in Section III.
We illustrate this approach with a case-study example based
on a military medical evacuation scenario in Section IV. We
discuss the implications of this approach in Section V, before
concluding with pointers to future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Systems are composed of parts or elements with relations-
hips between other elements of the system [1]. A system may
be defined as being a functionally, physically, and/or behavi-
ourally related group of regularly interacting interdependent
elements forming a unified whole [2]. However, how the parts
and relationships are gathered together as a whole must be
understood to appreciate how it forms as a system [3] [4].
System of Systems (SoS) is a term used to classify an arran-
gement of independent and interdependent systems collecti-
vely coming together for a task that none of the systems can
accomplish independently. However, systems generally retain
their own identities, management authorities, responsibilities,
goals and resources to support current and evolving needs
whilst adapting to meet SoS goals [5] [6]. The SoS concept
may, however, mean different things to different people. In an
organisational context, the SoS is the enterprise-wide sharing
of core business information across functional and geographi-
cal areas, often through third-party arrangements. Whereas,
military and defence SoSs are usually configurable sets of
constituent-systems in dynamic communication infrastructures
[7]. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that, outside of
engineering, the SoS term is relatively unknown, although
Network of Networks is occasionally used in a similar context.
SoSs can be considered as large-scale concurrent and distri-
buted systems, comprised of complex systems with autonomy
[8] [9] [10]. However, a SoS is equally a system that contains
two or more independently managed elements [1], regardless
of scale. A SoS is said to exist when there is a majority
presence of five characteristics: operational independence, ma-
nagerial independence, geographic distribution, evolutionary
development, and emergent behaviour [11] from combined
system interactions in ways not intended by the original single
system designers. This means actions cannot be predicted
through analysis at any level other than the SoS as a whole
[12]. Types of SoSs are generally classified as follows.
• Directed SoS: these are built and managed to fulfil spe-
cific purposes; they are centrally managed during long-
term operation to continue to fulfil and evolve those
purposes. Component systems maintain an ability to
operate independently, but their normal operational mode
is subordinated to the central managed purpose [11].
• Acknowledged SoS: these have recognised objectives, a
designated manager, and resources, but constituent sys-
tems retain their independent ownership, objectives, fun-
ding, as well as development and sustainment approaches.
Changes to systems are based on collaboration between
the SoS and systems [13].
• Collaborative SoS: these are distinct from Directed SoSs
in that the central management organisation has no coer-
cive power to run the system. The component systems
voluntarily collaborate to fulfil the agreed upon central
purposes [11].
• Virtual SoS: these lack both central management authority
and centrally agreed upon purposes; they may exist deli-
berately or accidentally, and large-scale behaviour emer-
ges, which may be desirable [11]. Participants informally
collaborate and manage their own systems to maintain
the system as a whole [1].
Because they are composed of systems that come together
in ways they were not originally designed for, SoSs share two
additional elements:
• Emergence: the formation of new behaviours due to
development or evolutionary processes coming together
[8]. Emergent behaviour evolves through the interactions
and collaborations that naturally develop within a SoS
[11]. Emergent behaviours must be carefully planned,
tested, and managed [2], which is a challenge when
designing for the SoS. The challenge is to learn how,
as the SoS evolves, emergence can flourish, yet retain
agility to quickly detect and defend against unintended
behaviours [4], while maintaining interoperability and
availability.
• Interoperability: the ability of two or more systems or
elements to use and exchange information [14]. SoSs
present an information sharing problem that introduces
complexity resulting from interoperability needs across
systems [15]. Moreover, the interoperability continuum
brings together the importance of governance, standard
operating procedures, technology, training and exercises,
and usage. Compatible technology alone may not achieve
interoperability, as technology, people, and organisational
integration all need to be aligned to achieve interopera-
bility [16]. Therefore, Sommerville et al. [17] argue a
system’s components and their relationships need to be
thoroughly understood, otherwise predictions cannot be
made as the scale and complexity increases.
Typical examples of SoSs may range from larger-scale
military operations, to smaller examples with fewer direct sta-
keholders [18] [19]. For example, the Smartphone is a common
system integrated into personal and work environments that
could be considered a SoS. Many Smart device and Internet
of Things (IoT) systems are likely to be SoSs [20] [21] where
strategic principles are required for design and operation [22].
Utilising the Internet, software applications on a Smart device
may be operated by users to connect to and control other smart
systems such as home security, communications systems, or
assistive technology [23].
An emergency response unit as a SoS brings together inde-
pendently owned and managed systems and services such as
fire, police, ambulance, hospitals and other facilities collabora-
ting to deliver a service on which reliance is placed to achieve
the SoS level objective or mission [15] [24]. Further reliance
may also be found when considering the over-arching role
of critical infrastructure. For example, where the health infra-
structure on a national level has an operational and managerial
dependence upon hospitals, medical centres, communication
systems, power systems and networks, transportation, health
insurance and finance networks to operate as a complex inter-
connected infrastructure [25].
Stakeholder needs and input are a vital consideration in
addition to the system interconnections and boundaries of the
SoS. For example, the ownership and operation of constituent
systems within a SoS by independent stakeholders may lead
to limitations on the exchange of information [24]. Security
risks will likely increase where stakeholders are not always
recognised across the SoS, or stakeholders of individual sy-
stems may have little interest, or resist the SoS demands on
their system giving lower priority to the SoS [2].
Trust mechanisms are an important factor throughout the
entire SoS life-cycle. Although there are a number of docu-
mented types of trust [26], trust is the willingness to be vulne-
rable, based on the positive expectations about the actions of
others [27], and it is an individual’s reliance on another party
under conditions of dependence and risk [28]. Trustworthiness
of the flow of information, the security of the service provision
and the protection of the supporting systems of the SoS need
to be taken into account [29]. However, a trust relationship is a
dynamic relationship that may change over time [17], and may
span across multiple systems, boundaries and people, leading
to varied assumptions, perceptions, expectations and appetite.
Through transparency and trust, active participation should be
focused on areas specifically related to the systems and the
SoS as a whole [30].
Security risk is likely to be present across most types of SoS,
with security risk assessment conducted at different levels. For
example, at the operational level, carried through to the deve-
lopment life-cycle, where security requirements should begin
with asset analysis and the context in which they are in [31].
This should also continue to focus on related human factors
and interoperability critical for the SoS operation. However,
program risk management in systems engineering programs is
also a factor where organisational design information requires
consideration and protection [32].
A range of risk assessment approaches may be used, but
articulating a clear and consistent risk statement to identify
possible adverse effects is always a core component [33]. In
the current context, risk assessment should rely on modelling,
and be repeatable, measureable, and auditable [34]. However,
before any SoS risk assessment begins, elements and factors
such as the context of use, mission goals, boundaries, relevant
stakeholders, scope, and risk criteria should be considered.
A grounded SoS characterisation therefore becomes a critical
prerequisite to a SoS security risk assessment.
III. APPROACH
As discussed, the term System of Systems can be applied
to a number of scenarios with differing scale or complexity
of interconnected systems, or geographical boundaries. SoSs
were mentioned decades ago [35] [36], perhaps in a slightly
different context, but it was Maier [11] that really gave a
more modern categorisation of SoSs, along with Dahmann
and Baldwin [13] a decade later bringing together the main
four categories that hold today. However, over those forty or
more years to present day, SoSs have changed considerably, for
example, with the concept of IoT and Smart devices, vehicles,
grids and cities. This is something that was perhaps not ac-
counted for in past work, and more unlikely in previous years
where the technical considerations were more mechanical and
machine-based.
Through our research [19] [37], it has also become evident
that use of a common less-technical language of security
and risk can assist multi-level stakeholder understanding.
Moreover, it is useful for operational stakeholders to first
align with the concept of SoSs before its complexity can
be identified and appreciated. Therefore, based on findings
from the review of literature and case-study implementati-
ons, to assist the communication bridge between operations
and requirements engineering, a clearer SoS distinction and
description is proposed. An example using simple models is
demonstrated in Figure 1. This is provided to ground the SoS
concept, definition and description, and provide a baseline
for continuing research between domains. This links directly
to current work designed to classify and characterise a SoS,
which began with work characterising the Afghan Mission
Network (AMN) [18].
Systems can be considered as ‘a coming together of pe-
ople, process, software and hardware, integrated to achieve
a purpose’. From an operational or design perspective, these
systems are likely to be composed of supporting sub-systems
and component systems interconnecting to fulfil system needs.
As these interconnections grow in scale, complexity increases
with evolutionary, geographical, environmental, cultural, or-
ganisational and technical demands. Systems may, therefore,
generally be considered as being small-scale, large-scale and
at times complex. A small-scale system could, however, still
be described as having complexity with software and har-
dware interactions, which in a different context could itself
be described as large-scale and complex. For example, when
considering the quantity of lines of code in software, interope-
rating with seamless background services to provide functional
applications. In either case, a large-scale complex system
may not always be a SoS. Furthermore, research suggests
the term System of Systems could equally apply to smaller
scale independent system collaborations with less complexity.
This difference is evident with examples ranging from basic
IoT applications, through to software dependant systems up to
large-scale governmental or military and defence SoSs.
A distinction may also be drawn where a single system
designed for an original purpose may evolve overtime, but may
only be an adaptation of itself to meet changing environmental
and cultural needs. This example may not qualify as a SoS.
However, it is also true within a SoS, an independent system
or lower-level systems designed for a different purpose, could
permanently become a component system of a SoS; it could
return to its original state, but may serve a greater purpose in
its new context.
SoSs can be described as containing independent systems
designed for a purpose different to that of the SoS as a whole.
Each upper-level individual system is one part of the whole.
SoSs may also contain systems which themselves are SoSs.
Evolution may have led to the need and creation of the SoS
that will likely continue to evolve and adapt for resilience until
which point it ceases to exist as a whole. This may be due
to the nature of the SoS only forming when required, e.g. an
emergency response unit. Alternatively, this may relate to the
permanent disbanding or disposal of the SoS.
We therefore propose an improved description to simply
define a System of Systems as being ‘the coming together
of independent systems collaborating for a new or higher
purpose’. Independent collaboration must be in place by one
means or another for the SoS to exist, otherwise they would
simply be independent systems. A Directed SoS seemingly
has the most in common with the genetic make-up of a
single independent system, usually with a top-down input, but
still requires bottom-up input to function. Evolutionary and
geographical challenges in present day exist in systems, and
so is not unique to SoSs, whereas emergence is more likely
within SoSs. The level of central control and oversight of the
Fig. 1. Simple Models for Systems and System of Systems
functional and operational SoS appears to be the overarching
feature, combined with the type and level of collaboration
from independent systems, their sub-systems, and varying trust
boundaries. We further propose that:
- A Directed SoS can be described as possessing ‘interre-
lated collaboration, with central management, operation
and control over the SoS as a whole’;
- An Acknowledged SoS has ‘designated management, but
limited control over the independent collaboration of the
SoS as a whole’;
- A Collaborative SoS has ‘no central management, so
operation and control must be formed and agreed as a
mutual independent collaboration’;
- A Virtual SoS has ‘individual independent collaboration
with no central management, operation or control of the
SoS as a whole’.
These refined descriptions may continue to align with
other research of SoSs [38] [11] [13] [1], and will be used
within the future SoS characterisation process for security risk
assessment. For example, previous work [18] considered an
approach using a candidate SoS to characterise and frame
the AMN as an Acknowledged SoS. We continue with this
approach originally based on work described by Dahmann
and Baldwin [39] drawing comparisons between a system and
Acknowledged SoS using systems engineering terminology.
As articulated in Figure 2, we modify and expand on this
work to consider subtle differences between other SoSs types
as a means to classify a given example in a likely SoS
environment. This is to assist the initial steps of a SoS security
risk assessment approach using a tool-supported framework
[40], which is intended to act as a further bridge between
operations and engineering environments.
IV. CASE STUDY EXAMPLE: A MEDEVAC SOS
In previous work with the AMN SoS, we identified a
range of services and mission threads vital to its operation.
One in particular supported medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
operations that we believe can also be considered a SoS given
the joint-force collaboration to provide a MEDEVAC service.
Therefore, inspired by operations of that nature, supported by
available literature, we implement a reduced-scale exemplar
of the typical interconnections of a MEDEVAC SoS. This will
be used as a case-study to apply and test a SoS security risk
assessment approach in on-going work.
Fig. 2. SoS Characteristics - extended from work by Dahmann and Baldwin [39]
However, prior to its risk assessment, we must determine
the scope of the independent system collaboration and its in-
terdependencies. The main focus is likely to be on identifying
where SoS managerial and operational control is in place, if
at all. When characterising a SoS with Figure 2, this helps us
consider initial questions that may include:
- Who are the high-level stakeholders - the main indepen-
dent systems of the SoS?
- Who are the other relevant stakeholders important to the
SoS achieving its mission?
- Who provides management oversight, governance, fun-
ding, and operational control of the SoS?
- Who is responsible for SoS design, development, testing
and implementation?
- What system boundaries exist for the SoS - do restrictions
apply?
- How is on-going SoS performance and behaviour moni-
tored to provide a resilient SoS balancing independent
system needs?
It should, however, be noted that in order to answer these
questions, intelligence gathering should first be conducted
to capture this type of information. These questions may,
therefore, guide the minimum amount of information for this
process. This may be a challenge for some systems or types of
SoS where there is a weak collaboration or trust relationships
providing limited information.
A. Considering a Joint-Force MEDEVAC as a SoS
In this scenario, the MEDEVAC operation contains three
independent system examples that can be loosely attributed to
the interaction of NATO operations with two Troop Contribu-
ting Nations (TCNs) to perform a continuum of care through
medical evacuation. We consider these as Alpha, Bravo, and
Charlie, coming together as independent systems collaborating
to achieve higher purpose.
To illustrate this interaction, consider a call raised for a
MEDEVAC, initiated by Bravo using a 9-Line request; this
is a template for the basic information needed for a medical
evacuation. Once received by a Tactical Operations Centre
(TOC) Officer, this is processed with the Patient Evacuation
Co-ordination Cell (PECC) who together initiate MEDEVAC.
The initial mission goal is to transport a patient to a Forward
Surgical Team (FST) within one hour – The Golden Hour
– from the Point of Injury (PoI). A first-stage Forward Air
MEDEVAC is called to transfer in-field casualties to a suitable
Forward Operating Base (FOB) FST. A Patient Movement
Request (PMR) is used for Tactical Air MEDEVAC patient
transfer from the FST to a next stage HQ hospital. Strategic
Air MEDEVAC is used to transfer patients outside of the area
of operations; this along with further care and repatriation to
the home nation is usually the responsibility of the independent
system. At each stage of this SoS interaction, each system has
their own role in achieving the continuum of care [41] [42].
B. Characterising MEDEVAC as a SoS
MEDEVAC Management and Oversight
Stakeholder Involvement: The primary stakeholders include
Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. Alpha provides managerial com-
mand and control to assist operations, although Alpha has
other interconnecting systems to achieve this function. Alpha
also provides medical oversight from the Main HQ outside
of the operational area, and Medical Director functions at
each level of command. External stakeholders may exist, for
example, with the integration of other Air Traffic Management
Systems, or development of some systems. Bravo and Charlie
each provide independent sub-systems of interaction for the
SoS. For example, Charlie Force 1 provides Air MEDEVAC,
and Force 2 provides FST medical treatment facilities. More-
over, both Bravo and Charlie may rely on individual external
air and medical facilities outside the area of operations. A
number of stakeholders therefore exist at lower levels. Some
local stakeholders may not be recognised by all systems.
Governance: Governance is provided by Alpha, with sup-
port of Bravo and Charlie, setting out formal procedures and
doctrine broadly describing the collaboration requirements.
Along with NATO type joining instructions and other third-
party type agreements, these provide a foundation in which
trust relationships are formed. Other requirements and regula-
tions exist at independent system level. Managerial oversight, a
secure network, services, data repositories, and some software
is provided by Alpha. Whereas, funding for technical use and
implementation sits with Bravo and Charlie [41] [42].
MEDEVAC Operational Environment
Operational Focus: In this scenario, Bravo has a limi-
ted role, but is the initiator of the process. A Bravo Field
Unit’s Medic provides in-field medical care, requesting the
MEDEVAC and documents care given, creating a chain of
patient information. Trust mechanisms are likely to be in place,
supported by technical measures to ensure this data flow is
maintained. Charlie has a greater role and depends upon more
than one system to achieve its mission, each individually
operated to fulfil the process, further managing patient care
and documentation stored in Alpha’s shared data repository.
Bravo and Charlie, therefore, each retain a level of autonomy
with some competing interests. However, operations are driven
by Alpha command levels and the MEDEVAC operation,
specifically through the PECC. Mission needs are guided by
a Common Operational Picture (COP) of tactical and medical
Situational Awareness (SA) to achieve its mission safely and
securely [41] [42] [43].
MEDEVAC Implementation
Acquisition: Some system and security requirements may
be mandated by Alpha for participation, however, Bravo and
Charlie would be responsible for capturing these needs within
their differing requirements to ensure interoperability. Alpha
provides an ‘as is’ set up for command and control, using
systems, services, and networks developed and tested outside
of the operational area. Various systems are also integrated
with different ownerships, e.g. the MC4 brand of in-field and
theater medical systems, or the Joint Medical Workstation
(JMeWS). However, Bravo and Charlie are responsible for
acquiring and implementing their own systems. This inclu-
des the common MC4 medical data system using software
from AHLTA provided by Alpha for accessing their central
repository, the Theatre Medical Data Store (TDMS) system.
Bravo use in-field handsets with AHLTA-Mobile, whereas
Charlie use Laptops with AHLTA-Theater to add patient
data. Other technical elements such as purpose-fitted Black
Hawk MEDEVAC helicopters and FST facilities are also the
responsibility of Charlie, but from separate sub-systems [43].
Test & Evaluation: It is likely that many of the lower
level systems may not be fully tested at SoS level before
implementation. Trust boundaries may be an obstacle, as a
negative could have adverse impact on external systems. MC4
systems would however have been tested by Alpha prior to its
use and dependency. Charlie may achieve a degree of testing
given its inter-relations, but it is more difficult to align with
Bravo, and Alpha. MEDEVAC testing exercises outside of the
operational environment may exist.
MEDEVAC Engineering and Design Considerations
Boundaries and Interfaces: Boundaries cover a range of
contexts of people, process, and technology, across land, sea,
air, space and cyber domains. However, given the flow of data,
cyber, air and geographical boundaries are of high importance,
with multi-national data regulations applying. The most im-
mediate trust boundaries are between the three independent
systems and their sub-systems, interfacing with other systems
and assets.
Performance & Behaviour: Alpha continue to provide
command and control with SA provided to all throughout
the continuum of care. This allows for on-going feedback
to improve their own capabilities, whilst providing input for
independent systems to align and balance SoS needs against
system demands. Performance may also be monitored at
casualty level, with reduction of issues and rates of survival
from critical golden hour care and transportation [41].
V. DISCUSSION
A. MEDEVAC as a SoS
As the MEDEVAC scenario is loosely based around a NATO
Joint-Force operation acting as one force, early assumptions
could indicate some alignment with a Directed SoS descrip-
tion. Despite Alpha mandating standard operating agreements
(STANAGS), each independent system operates with its own
autonomy. For example, Alpha has no direct link to Charlie
Air Corp, who have operational and managerial control of Air
MEDEVAC. However, Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie are reliant
on each other to fulfil the coming together, which could
perhaps lean towards a Collaborative SoS. From the review,
it is, however, evident the MEDEVAC would be considered
an Acknowledged SoS given its high-level distinction of
designated management by Alpha, with limited control over
the independent collaboration of Bravo and Charlie.
Other SoSs also exist within this configuration. For example,
the Electronic Health Record (EHR) data flow to support the
continuum of care consists of various systems providing input
and output, some of which interface with home nations [43].
Also, the MC4 systems providing tools to digitally record
and transfer medical data using joint medical software, with
commercial and government-off-the-shelf products, acting as
a deployed EHR repository for battlefield surveillance [44].
Additional considerations such as these may only become
apparent once systems information has been gathered and
assessed. By following the steps illustrated, this provides a
simple process for a SoS level stakeholder to identify specific
characteristics of an inter-connected systems environment, and
potentially classify it as a SoS based on this output, clarifying
where managerial and operational independence and control
are in place. This in-turn directs future assessment of areas of
dependency and complexity, or specific areas of risk.
Although we have demonstrated the ease in which questions
may be applied to a potential SoS scenario using the refined
descriptions, answers may differ when considering from whose
view the SoS is being assessed. We have provided a general
overview of the MEDEVAC SoS as a whole. However, this
may be closer to Alpha’s view, whereas, the view of Bravo
may be minimal given the limited interaction it has with many
Alpha or Charlie sub-systems.
B. Assessing SoS Security Risk
The MEDEVAC example demonstrates some key challenges
to SoS environments where interoperability is vital to the
SoS success, yet it is not always possible to have visibility
or direct knowledge and interaction with all systems. When
relating this to data flow and information security, potential
risks may be overlooked. A system may also have visibility of
another system, but have limited knowledge in which to base a
security risk assessment. It is, therefore, critical to identify the
main context of a given SoS and its characteristics, identifying
relevant independent systems and stakeholders in a top-down
manner, decomposed into its systems, before being able to
appreciate the complexity and input from the bottom up.
The proposed baseline understanding of SoSs helps set
the likely type of SoS, its characteristics, management and
control boundaries. However, there are other considerations
to account for when assessing security risk in SoS, certainly
when considering the development life-cycle of the SoS and
constituent systems, and the supply chain throughout. Boun-
daries also cross many domains, such as land, sea, air, space
and cyber, networks, the physical or electronic realms, cultural,
organisational or geographical and environmental, all of which
may be constrained by changing trust equations, legal and
regulatory requirements. This places a greater reliance on
requirements engineering to reduce system and SoS risk. As
a result, the SoS would benefit from consistent approaches to
risk from operations to requirements, helping to reduce gaps
where risks may otherwise evolve or be unaccounted for within
differing areas and contexts of engineering or indeed at an
individual or organisational level.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the diversity of small and
large-scale SoS examples in the present day, each in a dif-
ferent context. Our research has identified confusion exists for
multi-level stakeholders when defining and classifying inter-
connected systems as a SoS. For example, SoSs range from
being a single person interacting with systems, to large or
national scale organisational collaborations. Individually, these
may have quite different standards and policies in place, if at
all, to achieve its independent purpose in addition to its SoS
function. An IoT as a SoS may be managed and operated at a
single user level integrating with other systems. Whereas, an
organisational SoS is likely governed by legal or regulatory
requirements, meeting these through policy and procedures.
Identifying the level of managerial and operational in-
dependence, control and governance required for the SoS
interconnectivity is important to achieve its new or higher
purpose. To address this and aid multi-stakeholder commu-
nication and understanding, this paper has provided a simple
repeatable process and questions, using a baseline approach
as a prerequisite to address important initial considerations
supporting a SoS security risk assessment approach. This
process was applied to an example MEDEVAC case-study,
where information from these questions helped to characterise
and define the SoS collaboration, its context and environment.
For example, where the SoS has a dependency on secure and
interoperable systems to fulfil its SoS mission goals.
These needs should be addressed early in the development
life-cycle. The scale and complexity of interacting systems
towards integration and operational challenges must be ac-
counted for, as detailed as possible considering all needs and
requirements to satisfy stakeholder and SoS mission needs.
This should assist continual monitoring and assessment at an
operational level to meet stakeholder needs, security, intero-
perability, or vital situational awareness supporting resilience
and risk reduction. Modelling, engineering and operating SoSs
is therefore a challenge for engineering, security and human
factors communities, where gaps were identified lacking in
formal approaches applied in a SoS security and risk context.
Our current and future work will continue to address these
areas to test and validate a security risk assessment approach
for SoSs using a tool-supported framework. Current work, for
example, integrates a modified OCTAVE Allegro risk approach
[45] integrated with the use of CAIRIS [40] for modelling
and visualisation of security risk in the MEDEVAC SoS,
whilst demonstrating the benefits of model-driven approaches
for SoSs. The challenge however remains, identifying the
minimum level of information in which a SoS assessment can
be based on from its varied relationships and interconnections.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The research described in this paper was
funded by Bournemouth University studentship
DSTLX1000104780R BOURNEMOUTH PhD RASOS.
We are also grateful to Dstl for their sponsorship of this
work.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Sommerville, Software Engineering, 10th ed. Pearson, 2015.
[2] Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, for Acquisition and
Technology, Systems and Software Engineering, Systems and Software
Engineering. Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems, 1st ed.,
Washington, DC: ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008, 2008.
[3] R. Staker, “Decision support for complex systems-of-systems,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 16th National Conference of the Australian Society for
Operations Research. Citeseer, 2001.
[4] J. Boardman and B. Sauser, “System of Systems-the meaning of of,”
in 2006 IEEE/SMC International Conference on System of Systems
Engineering. IEEE, 2006, p. 6.
[5] Director of Systems Engineering, Systems Engineering Guide for Sy-
stems of Systems: Summary, Department of Defense, Office of the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Washington, D.C., Dec.
2010.
[6] K. Baldwin, J. Dahmann, and J. Goodnight, “Systems of Systems and
Security: A Defense Perspective,” Insight, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 11–14,
2011.
[7] J. A. Lane and D. Epstein, “What is a System of Systems and why
should I care?” University of Southern California, 2013.
[8] V. Chiprianov, L. Gallon, M. Munier, P. Aniorte, and V. Lalanne, “Chal-
lenges in Security Engineering of Systems-of-Systems,” in Troisie`me
Confe´rence en Inge´nieriE du Logiciel, 2014, p. 143.
[9] M. Jamshidi, System of systems engineering: innovations for the twenty-
first century. John Wiley & Sons, 2011, vol. 58.
[10] C. Harvey and N. A. Stanton, “Safety in System-of-Systems: ten key
challenges,” Safety science, vol. 70, pp. 358–366, 2014.
[11] M. W. Maier, “Architecting principles for systems-of-systems,” in IN-
COSE International Symposium, vol. 6, no. 1. Wiley Online Library,
1996, pp. 565–573.
[12] G. B. Dyson, Darwin among the machines: The evolution of global
intelligence. Basic Books, 2012.
[13] J. S. Dahmann and K. J. Baldwin, “Understanding the current state
of US defense systems of systems and the implications for systems
engineering,” in Systems Conference, 2008 2nd Annual IEEE. IEEE,
2008, pp. 1–7.
[14] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Standard Com-
puter Dictionary: A Compilation of IEEE Standard Computer Glossa-
ries, IEEE, New York, NY, 1990.
[15] H. Dogan, S. A. Pilfold, and M. Henshaw, “The role of Human Factors
in addressing Systems of Systems complexity,” in Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics (SMC), 2011 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE,
2011, pp. 1244–1249.
[16] Homeland Security, “The System of Systems Approach for
Interoperable Communications [online],” 2017, Available From:
http://www.npstc.org/download.jsp?tableId=37&column=217&id=2458&
file=SOSA pproachforInteroperableCommunications 02.pdf [Accessed
4 October 2017].
[17] I. Sommerville, D. Cliff, R. Calinescu, J. Keen, T. Kelly, M. Kwiat-
kowska, J. Mcdermid, and R. Paige, “Large-scale complex IT systems,”
Communications of the ACM, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 71–77, 2012.
[18] D. Ki-Aries, S. Faily, H. Dogan, and C. Williams, “Re-framing The
AMN: A Case Study Eliciting and Modelling a System of Systems using
the Afghan Mission Network,” in 11th IEEE International Conference on
Research Challenges in Information Science 10-12 May 2017 Brighton,
UK. IEEE, May 2017.
[19] D. Ki-Aries, H. Dogan, S. Faily, P. Whittington, and C. Williams,
“From Requirements to Operation: Components for Risk Assessment
in a Pervasive System of Systems,” in 2017 IEEE 25th International
Requirements Engineering Conference Workshops (REW)-Proceedings
of 4th International Workshop on Evolving Security & Privacy Requi-
rements Engineering. IEEE, 2017, pp. 83–89.
[20] P. Maia, E. Cavalcante, P. Gomes, T. Batista, F. C. Delicato, and
P. F. Pires, “On the Development of Systems-of-Systems Based on the
Internet of Things: A Systematic Mapping,” in Proceedings of the 2014
European Conference on Software Architecture Workshops, ser. ECSAW
’14. ACM, 2014, pp. 23:1–23:8.
[21] F. Alkhabbas, R. Spalazzese, and P. Davidsson, “IoT-based Systems of
Systems,” in Proceedings of the 2nd edition of Swedish Workshop on
the Engineering of Systems of Systems (SWESOS 2016). Gothenburg
University, 2016.
[22] Homeland Security, “Strategic Principles for Securing
the Internet of Things [online],” 2016, available From:
https://www.dhs.gov/securingtheIoT [Accessed 30 June 2017].
[23] P. Whittington and H. Dogan, “SmartPowerchair: Characterization and
Usability of a Pervasive System of Systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Human-Machine Systems, 2016.
[24] C. B. Nielsen, P. G. Larsen, J. Fitzgerald, J. Woodcock, and J. Pele-
ska, “Systems of Systems Engineering: Basic Concepts, Model-Based
Techniques, and Research Directions,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 48,
no. 2, pp. 18:1–18:41, Sep. 2015.
[25] M. Branagan, R. Dawson, and D. Longley, “Security Risk Analysis for
Complex Systems.” in ISSA, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[26] D. H. McKnight and N. L. Chervany, “The meanings of trust,” 1996.
[27] D. E. Zand, “Trust and managerial problem solving,” Administrative
science quarterly, pp. 229–239, 1972.
[28] S. C. Currall and T. A. Judge, “Measuring trust between organizational
boundary role persons,” Organizational behavior and Human Decision
processes, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 151–170, 1995.
[29] C. Richardson, “Bridging the air gap: an information assurance per-
spective,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southampton, 2012.
[30] J. Dahmann, K. J. Baldwin, and G. Rebovich, “Systems of systems and
net-centric enterprise systems,” in 7th Annual Conference on Systems
Engineering Research, 2009.
[31] D. G. Firesmith, “Analyzing and specifying reusable security requi-
rements,” Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA, Tech. Rep., 2003.
[32] G. Rebovich Jr. and M. Authors, MITRE Systems Engineering
Guide [online]. MITRE Corporation, 2014, available From:
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/se-guide-book-
interactive.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2016].
[33] I. Bo¨ro¨cz, “Risk to the Right to the Protection of Personal Data,”
European Data Protection Law Review, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 467–480, 2016.
[34] A. Jones, “A framework for the management of information security
risks,” BT technology journal, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 30–36, 2007.
[35] R. L. Ackoff, “Towards a system of systems concepts,” Management
science, vol. 17, no. 11, pp. 661–671, 1971.
[36] M. C. Jackson and P. Keys, “Towards a system of systems methodolo-
gies,” Journal of the operational research society, pp. 473–486, 1984.
[37] D. Ki-Aries and S. Faily, “Persona-Centred Information Security Awa-
reness,” Computers & Security, vol. 70, pp. 663–674, 2017.
[38] P. Boxer and S. Garcia, “Limits to the use of the zachman framework
in developing and evolving architectures for complex systems of sys-
tems,” CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA SOFTWARE
ENGINEERING INST, Tech. Rep., 2009.
[39] J. S. Dahmann, G. Rebovich Jr, and J. A. Lane, “Systems Engineering
for Capabilities,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2008.
[40] S. Faily, “CAIRIS [online],” February 2018, Available from:
https://cairis.org [Accessed 28 February 2018].
[41] Col. Dr. I. Hartenstein, “Medical Evacuation in Afghanistan: Lessons
Identified Lessons Learned [online],” Tech. Rep., 2008, available From:
https://stopthemedevacmadness.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/nato-
medical-evacuation-in-afghanistan-mp-hfm-157-05.pdf[Accessed 19
January 2018].
[42] Col. Dr. I. Hartenstein, “Medical Evacuation Policies
in NATO: Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Eva-
cuation [online],” Tech. Rep., 2008, available From:
https://stopthemedevacmadness.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/nato-
medical-evacuation-policies-in-nato-mp-hfm-157-01.pdf [Accessed 19
January 2018].
[43] M. J. Meier, “A providers perspective: Utilizing deployed in-
formation technology to care for our wounded warriors,” The
Joint Staff, J4/HSSD. presented at the 2011 Military He-
alth System Conference, January 24-27, National Harbor, Maryland:
The Defense Technical Information Center, 2011, available From:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556202.pdf [Accessed 19 January
2018].
[44] MC4, “The MC4 System [online],” MC4 US Army, 2018, Availa-
ble From: http://www.mc4.army.mil/Mc4System/Mc4Sys.aspx [Acces-
sed 15 January 2018].
[45] R. A. Caralli, J. F. Stevens, L. R. Young, and W. R. Wilson, “Introducing
OCTAVE Allegro: Improving the information security risk assessment
process,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2007.
